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Introduction – the ‘problem’ of teenage pregnancy and parenting 
There is an extensive body of research dating back to the 1970s that has framed discussions 
of teenage pregnancy and parenting in ‘epidemic’ terms (Luttrell 2003).  Public opinion often 
uncritically adopts the same discourse.  While there are more teenage parents because there 
are more teenagers – some 16 million young women aged 15-19 gave birth each year (United 
Nations Population Fund 2013) – rates of teenage pregnancy and parenting have steadily 
declined in developed Western countries during the last 30 years (Kamp 2007). While 
teenagers from all social classes become pregnant it is those from disadvantaged social 
groups who are more likely to persist with their pregnancy and become teenage parents 
(Luker 1996; D. Kelly 2000; Kost, Henshaw and Carlin 2010).  In the UK, the likelihood of 
becoming pregnant and going on to parent your child is almost ten times higher for 
marginalized young women compared to those from families with professional backgrounds 
(Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2002, 2004; Colen, Geronimus and Phipps 2006). 
 The decline in the teenage birthrate is clearly not paralleled by a decline in concern 
about ‘too-soon’ parenting.  Teenage pregnancy and parenting have been constructed as an 
increasingly compelling and complex policy dilemma.  In what Ulrich Beck (1992) calls the 
risk society where a successful D-I-Y biography is something that is to be managed by 
making good choices, and by participation in education systems and labour markets, the 
dilemma of parenting while still a teenager is commonly associated with a range of 
disadvantages for the teenage parent, for his or her child, ‘for society in general and taxpayers 
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in particular’ (UNICEF 2001:3; see also Bonell 2004 and Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2004).  
Furthermore, neo-liberal agendas of re-privatization and the re-configuring of the welfare 
state have had a role to play in how teenage pregnancy and parenting are managed (Lesko 
2001). 
Public ‘(mis)representations’ and diverse discourses – religious, medical, legal, and 
psychological – frame the way teenage pregnancy and parenting are understood as particular 
‘problems’ (Luttrell 2003: 25).    Teenage pregnancy and parenting have, at times, been 
suggested as the greatest cause of dropping out of school for teenage girls (Brindis and 
Philliber 1998); yet teenage parenting can also be a powerful motivating force for previously 
disengaged students.  As this paper is prepared, one of us is following the media in Ireland 
where a parenting teenager, formerly disengaged from education, wishing to return to school 
and having been offered a place in a highly-regarded second-level school had that offer 
withdrawn when her status as a parent became known to the school on the basis that it was 
the ‘duty’ of the Principal ‘to protect the honorable majority’ of his pupils (McCarthy 2012).  
For Deirdre Kelly (2000) discourses of teenage pregnancy are a ‘stigma contest’ 
between social, religious and economic conservatives and their ‘wrong-family’ discourse; 
oppositional movements such as feminism and their ‘wrong-society’ discourse; teenage 
parents’ own ‘stigma-is-wrong’ discourse and bureaucratic experts and their dominant 
‘wrong-girl’ discourse.  This ‘wrong-girl’ discourse scrutinizes the motivations and choices 
of pregnant and parenting teenagers in ways that older women who are pregnant and 
parenting are never scrutinized.  Feminist discourses have critiqued the focus on judging on 
the ‘choices’ of pregnant teenagers, arguing that rational choice-making is always constrained 




These competing discourses that shape our understanding of teen pregnancy and 
parenting position the subject in an already constituted category (teenage parents), a category 
that is almost universally considered to be negative, non-adult, and which evidences the 
inability of certain young people to ‘appropriately’ govern their own desires and behavior.  
These discourses, their limits and possibilities, the things that are able to be said, or not, about 
teenage pregnancy and parenting, the persons who can speak, who can manage this problem, 
and those who can’t, become part of the self-making of young parents themselves.  These 
discourses attempt to establish that these young people, as evidenced by their state, are 
unable to participate in the world as autonomous, choice-making adults.  This position/state 
enables an array of adult expertise and institutions to intervene into, and make judgments 
about their lives, their choices and the future prospects of both them and their children. 
Against this background we want to suggest that adults are the ones who do the social 
science that takes young people as its object – in whatever form, in relation to whatever issue 
or problem.  As a consequence adult social scientists, who once were young, are continually 
confronted with the dilemma of ‘what mode is appropriate for giving form to thinking’ when 
we take young people as our object (Rabinow 2009: 27-8). In this paper we draw on social 
theory, our background in Youth Studies and, for one of us, experiential knowledge as a 
former teenage parent, to trouble and unsettle the social science that engages with the 
problem of teenage pregnancy and parenting.  Our intent here is to work with this particular 
‘problem’ as a mechanism to consider the methodological possibilities of reflexive hindsight 
in the social sciences. In terms that owe much to the work of Michel Foucault, and his legacy, 
we seek to explore an ethos, a disposition to the conduct of what might be called a ‘critical 
social science’ or ‘critical Youth Studies’ (Fine 2008; Giroux 2012), as we take young people 
in general, and teenage parents in particular, as our objects.  Foucault (2007a: 118) described 
this ethos as a critical ontology of ourselves: a form of critique which is ‘at one and the same 
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time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them’.  This ethos provides no ultimate resolution to the 
dilemmas of adults doing social science on/with/for/about young people; ‘the theoretical and 
practical experience we have of our limits and of the possibility of moving beyond them is 
always limited and determined’ (Foucault 2007a: 118). 
The paper explores what it might mean to work at/on the limits of reflexive hindsight, 
and engages with the problem of looking back — the possibilities and limits of judgment, 
memory, imagination, sentimentality, romanticising, forgetting.  To do this we construct a 
conversation where we identify ourselves as individual authors of different parts, departing 
from a more traditional, linear account. While we highlight teenage parenting as a particular 
example, the multivocality of the paper serves to underscore the broader methodological 
argument.  We create a warrant for this approach in what follows. 
Reflexive hindsight: we once were young 
What sense can be made of a problem such as teen pregnancy and parenting?  What positions 
are available to us as we do the social science that might take this problem as its object?  We 
share a general concern with exploring the spaces, the positions, the judgments and forms of 
address that are available to us as adult social scientists who are interested, in various ways, 
with doing Youth Studies.  More particularly we, as individuals, come to these discussions 
from a number of different positions and with a variety of interests.  Some of these have a 
more recent history.  Some, possibly more evocative and powerful, come from when once we 
were young. 
Annelies: 
It is the end of a long, happy Sunday in Dublin. We — my daughter, son-in-law, 
grand-children and their extended family — have spent the day in my apartment 
sharing High Tea on the occasion of my daughter’s 35th birthday.  In the evening, 
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after they have headed home and before I commence the dishwashing, I pour myself a 
solitary glass of wine and toast my teenage parent self, 35 years on.  
This moment of reflection was not orchestrated; it had occurred unbidden in that 
suddenly quiet moment at the end of a special day.  Day by day my daughter and I 
have moved forward from her birth in New Zealand when I was 16; we have quietly 
accumulated 35 years of walking through our lives together.  This thought brings me 
such joy; this thought would bring any first-time parent such joy. I smile, draw the 
Sunday papers closer: a quick scan before I begin the clean up. And this is what I 
read: 
I once saw a teenage mother on the bus teaching her toddler how to say the F-
word. She found it hilarious, as if she were training a parrot.  I was shocked. 
The poor child was being robbed of his innocence at least a decade too soon, 
and at the hands of his own mother. (Smith 2011:11) 
The article, by philosopher Robert Rowland Smith, was concerned with whether 
swearing is wrong.  He opines that sometimes swearing is okay; it is the means by 
which we ‘convert a mere word into a real thing, something more adequate for the 
occasion’.  But as I sat there with my glass of wine I struggled with why he felt the 
need to commence his philosophical discussion on swearing by taking the time to 
label a less-than-ideal mother as ‘a teenage mother’.  What did the age of this 
particular mother have to do with anything?  As a philosopher, I would have hoped he 
would know better than to contribute to that particular discourse.  At the same time, I 
would have thought that 35 years on I would have developed a thicker skin to this 
discourse. 
Back then, my working-class parents, post-WWII European immigrants to New 
Zealand had ‘made it’ to the middle-classes and had strong community networks that 
supported all of us in the transition of my daughter joining our family.  I did, over 
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time, complete my secondary schooling, but not in the public gaze.  Our familial 
response to my pregnancy was to hide my pregnant-self from my former school.  I 
can’t say my school would not have supported me if I had declared that I was now a 
parenting student: it never occurred to us to ask.  Teenage pregnancy and parenting in 
the 1970s was a negative space, and withdrawal was what one did. 
One of the experiences of that time that has prompted my continuing interest in the 
experiences of teenage parents happened shortly after my last minute choice to 
become a teenage parent.  I struggle with that word ‘choice’: is not making a decision 
a ‘choice’?  The denial and ambivalence that surrounded the issues of first-boyfriend 
teenage sex.  The possibility of maybe being pregnant.  The eventual appointment 
with an anonymous Doctor (me in school uniform).  The doing-nothing with knowing 
I am pregnant and becoming more pregnant and my clothes will not hide this forever.  
The day I finally summon the courage to utter the word ‘pregnant’ to my parents.  The 
‘We’ll get through this together’ of my family (but what is this ‘this’ that we will get 
through?).  The daily going off to school.  Seemingly, nothing changes.  Nothing 
happens as this baby will be adopted, will become someone else’s baby.  The school 
year finishes and exams are sat and still no-one knows.  Four months later and a 
daughter is born.  And three days later in a moment of ambivalence, needing to know 
she will be safe, I decide to keep her.  
When my daughter was six weeks old I took her back to the doctor who had attended 
her birth for a check-up.  He was not our family doctor but a specialist.  I remember 
walking into his surgery, holding this tiny baby girl swaddled in a blue cocoon.  When 
last he’d seen me, at the birth, ‘baby X’ was to be adopted.  I remember his curt 
disbelief when he saw my daughter was with me.  I recall, and still feel, his asking me 
why I had ‘that child’ with me; his blunt assertion that I had ruined my life and, 
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probably, her life.  At that point, riddled with the insecurities that all new parents 
encounter, his words nearly crushed me.  Many times in the intervening years I have 
recalled that moment and the impact of that particular discourse, one that framed my 
decision to compound the mistake of being a pregnant teenager with the even more 
damaging mistake of becoming a teenage parent in fixed, overtly negative, ways. 
Years later I would wish he could see the person my daughter had become, as far 
from a ruin as it is possible to be.  I commenced my doctoral research confident in 
having proven him wrong: both of us had thrived.  That research brought me into 
close engagement with what social science tells us about teenage parents and their life 
patterns and I developed a different narrative of my life.  I had suffered marital 
instability.  I did struggle to continue with my education.  I did earn far less than I 
would have if I’d made different ‘choices’.  My victory narrative was now muted. I 
had found myself in the social science literature and these discourses demonstrated 
that I had indeed conformed with the anticipated (that is, apparently lesser) 
trajectories for those who parent-too-soon.  
The understandings generated by traditional social science about teenage pregnancy and 
parenting do sometimes resonate with my embodied knowledge, but only in partial ways. The 
ways we come to know are always in some way limited but those limitations become 
troubled, allowing a reframing of our knowing.  Thinking back, the emotionality — not only 
the burning fears and doubts but also the feelings of redemption that becoming a parent 
provided — was rarely evident in what the literature told me of the lives of teenage parents.  
With hindsight, I have come to understand that first parenting experience – that supposedly 
ruinous journey – as one surrounded by a strong, loving family, full of naivety and happiness.  
In contrast, my second parenting experience which occurred ten years later, in the context of 
maturity and marriage, was so much more traumatic.  This contrast simply serves to illustrate 
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that the kinds of events that the social sciences seek to explore and understand are rarely 
simple, never static and demand knowledge practices which accommodate that complexity 
and the possibilities that reside within complexity.  
Peter: 
In a 2011 article (Kelly 2011a) I discussed the ways in which Australian writer Tim 
Winton’s recent novel Breath (2008) could be read as an allegorical tale about the 
horrors of being ordinary, and of the teenage years as being a time in life when some 
young people sought out, or stumbled into, situations and behaviours that, in their 
riskiness and danger, promised to make their lives less ordinary.  I suggested that part 
of the power of Winton’s narrative was that it is a story told from the vantage point of 
middle-age.  From this standpoint — hindsight — we can selectively review a life and 
identify and locate missed opportunities, successes, failings, thwarted ambitions, un-
realised dreams.  At the end of the story Winton’s principal character, the middle-aged 
Bruce Pike (Pikelet), reflects on a life marked by personal loss, a broken marriage, 
physical and mental breakdown, and yet some sort of parlous redemption: 
I didn’t exactly pull myself together…but bits of me did come around again, as 
flies or memories or subatomic particles will for reasons of their own. Bit by bit I 
congregated…and then somehow I cohered. I went on and had another life. 
(Winton, 2008: 211) 
My discussion of the possibilities that the position of hindsight offers was situated in 
relation to a project that colleagues and I had been working on that was concerned with 
the cultural drivers of young people’s low, medium and high risk use of alcohol.  In the 
discussions about the ontological politics (Law 2004) that shaped our research our own 
youth, our own memories, were an explicit, but often, also, unspoken dimension of our 
discussions about culture, young people and alcohol.  We enacted and told stories about 
our experiences growing up with alcohol, the drinking, the parties, the fun, the intense 
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sociability, the stupid things we did, the risks, the almost complete lack of focus on 
future consequences or possibilities.  
Winton’s use of hindsight, of memory, provides Bruce Pike with the opportunity to 
reflect on and reconstruct a past with a certain worldliness, an insightfulness, a sense of 
possibilities — lost and taken.  As a technique that enables Breath to work as allegory, 
I suggested that hindsight provides us with a vantage point that we don’t possess in the 
now, in the moments when we choose, embrace, stumble upon things that may be far 
reaching in consequence and significance — when we are young and/or old.  Yet, when 
we and others do Youth Studies we often do so in ways that suggest that current 
generations of young people ought have developed a risk aware, prudent, responsible 
disposition to present behaviours and future consequences.  Ought to be able, with 
foresight, to imagine and colonise their futures in ways that can guard against damage, 
hurt and pain.  To, in effect, dis-enchant their presents and futures and render them 
amenable to calculation, guided by expertise. 
It was in the (conversational) spaces at the intersection of our different experiences, our 
intellectual practice, and the benefits provided by the position of hindsight that we began to 
give a particular form to our thinking about the limits and possibilities of the knowledge 
practices that shape the way we could imagine doing Youth Studies/social science.  In 
particular how could a particular standpoint — a reflexive hindsight shaped by experience, 
intellectual training and the limits and possibilities of memory, of forgetting, of self 
censorship and revelation — contribute to our practice? 
Youth studies as adult social science 
Peter:  
In various spaces I have argued that Youth Studies is a diverse, far from harmonious 
or homogeneous discursive terrain populated by psychologists, sociologists, cultural 
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theorists, criminologists, educational theorists, feminists, postmodernists, 
poststructuralists.  The institutionalized intellectuality embodied in Youth Studies 
expertise travels across and constitutes this domain for a variety of purposes, 
professed and implied.  Expertise in Youth Studies takes youth as its object — a 
simple enough statement.   Youth is problematized in the service of empowerment 
and emancipation, variously understood.  Youth are made knowable so that they 
might be educated — differently, better, to the same level as normal Youth.  Youth is 
researched so that their desires, motivations, identities, subjectivities, intelligence, 
performance, resiliency, delinquency and/or aggression might be identified, noted, 
calculated, measured.  All in the service of ends as diverse as increased school 
retention rates (Simmons and Thompson 2011); smoother transitions between school 
and work (Kelly, McGuinness and O’Connell 2012); safer sex practices (Hillier and 
Harrison 2007); less alcohol and drug use (Johnson 2013); increased employability 
(Winterton and Irwin 2012) ; and the avoidance, management or minimization of risk 
(Rimmer 2012).  In these accounts I have developed an argument that Youth is an 
artefact of expertise, constructed at the intersection of a wide range of knowledges 
about Youth and so-called Youth issues.  I have suggested that how we imagine these 
intersections produces our understandings of Youth.  These understandings have 
consequences — material, symbolic and for a sense of self — in the lives of young 
people.  As an artefact of expertise, Youth is principally about becoming: becoming 
an adult, a citizen, independent, responsible.  There is some sense in which all 
constructions of Youth defer to this narrative of becoming, of transition.  Moreover, 




Our aim here is not to suggest or claim that institutionalised Youth Studies/social science has 
little or no value.  Or to suggest that Youth Studies should only do certain work in particular 
ways. Rather, our intent is to explore the ways in which we can trouble or unsettle the various 
ways in which we, and others, can think about and do Youth Studies.  The work of John Law 
provides one means to frame this unsettling.  In his After Method Law (2004: 2-4) seeks to 
trouble the boundaries, the limits and possibilities of institutionalised social scientific 
knowledge practices.  In this work Law stresses that conventional ways of doing social 
science can produce knowledge, outcomes and consequences that can support certain truth 
claims and make significant contributions to human knowledge and understandings of 
important issues.  However, if, as Law suggests, so much of the natural, the social and the 
cultural is ‘vague, diffuse or unspecific, slippery, emotional, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct’, 
then can the institutionalized, even standardized, rule-bound knowledge practices of the 
social sciences enact understandings that can account for these realities?  Or do we need to 
‘teach ourselves to know some of the realities of the world using methods unusual to or 
unknown in social science’.  
In his initial engagement with this question Law discusses some possibilities: 
‘knowing as embodiment’ where we come to know ‘through the hungers, tastes, discomfort, 
or pains of our bodies’.  Knowing as ‘emotionality or apprehension’ would bring into view 
the ‘worlds of sensibilities, passions, intuitions, fears and betrayals’.  We might consider 
‘how far whatever it is that we know travels and whether it still makes sense in other 
locations and if so how’; this would be ‘knowing as situated inquiry’.  Law argues that we 
need to think about and embrace the sense that our ways of knowing — despite our desires to 
present them in terms of validity, certainty and rigour — are, indeed, imprecise and that, 
therefore, we need to ‘find ways of knowing the indistinct and the slippery without trying to 
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grasp and hold them tight.  Here knowing would become possible through techniques of 
deliberate imprecision’. 
Law’s work is not unique, but it does provide a generative vocabulary for capturing 
and locating much of what interests us in thinking about knowledge practices.  A key 
ordering concept is his idea of method assemblage (Law 2004: 144).  He suggests that 
method assemblage is a process of crafting and enacting boundaries between presence, 
manifest absence and Otherness.  Any set of knowledge practices, any methodology ‘makes 
something present by making absence’.  The concept of method assemblage tries to make 
explicit and imagine the consequences of a particular ‘crafting, bundling, or gathering of 
relations’ between these elements.  The challenge, as we imagine it, is to identify, to unsettle 
what is excluded, impossible, absent when, for example, we consider and enact the problem 
of the teenage parent.  What role or place is to be allocated or found for sexuality, for desire, 
for globalised education systems and labour markets, for emotional commitments, 
understandings and ideals of family, of choice, of the future?  Where is the ‘successful’ 
teenage parent?  What, then, is present?  What is absent?  Who/what makes such choices?  
What might be the consequences (intended or otherwise) of such choices? 
It is in this context that the recent work of Zygmunt Bauman makes a provocative 
contribution to what might be called the re-enchantment of a social scientific imagination.  
Here, the character of this work can only be briefly sketched but turns on an interest in the 
ways in which individual biographies and histories are structured by social forces, and ‘in 
particular how men and women are brought face to face with contradictions in their own lives 
that are utterly beyond personal and biographical resolution’ (see Tester 2004: 6-10).  Being 
pregnant at 15, for example, is at one level, only a biological fact, a state.  At so many other 
levels, in so many other ways, such a state is itself pregnant with ambiguity, ambivalence, 
uncertainty and contradiction.  Related to this mission and these problems is the sort of 
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political action that is informed by a sociological imagination that takes this form.  As Tester 
suggests, Bauman’s work has most often taken a course that seeks to unsettle the many 
intellectual, business and governmental projects which assume or presume that the ‘world is 
clear to the understanding (or can be made clear as soon as the ‘correct’ method is discovered 
or as soon as the obstacles to clarity are got out of the way)’.  Bauman’s embrace of the 
possibilities and problems of ambivalence, and recognition of the all too human tendency to 
seek to impose order on this ambivalence, provokes what Tester identifies as his ethical 
commitment to ‘attend to those who are made to suffer most sharply from the ambivalence of 
the human condition’. 
In encountering dominant understandings of teen parenting, in examining the ways in 
which a range of experts, agencies, educators, politicians, commentators claim some 
authority to critique, judge and intervene, in trying to understand the lives that are shaped in 
the present and the future as a consequence of decisions taken and choices made (or not) in 
the face of such interventions, we are brought face to face with the limits imposed and the 
possibilities enacted by the ambivalence of teen parenting and of the many attempts to 
exterminate this ambivalence (Bauman 1990). 
Beyond judgment: how have we become what we are? 
 
It was in the third year of my research, and Grace asked if I would play ‘a pregnant 
girl at the clinic.’. . . I grabbed the props (a hospital robe and a magazine) and sat 
impatiently jiggling my leg as if I had been waiting a long time to be seen. Shantae, 
who was playing the nurse, walked up with her clipboard and gruffly announced my 
name, ‘Wendy Luttrell.’ I stood up, feeling a bit shaken hearing my name called out 
so publicly and in such an authoritative tone.  We moved to a space set up with a long 
table and two chairs.  The ‘nurse’ ordered me to lie down and roll up my sleeve.  She 
forcefully pulled at my arm and tightly wrapped the make believe blood pressure rope 
around it until it pinched.  Before I could even say, ‘Stop—that hurts,’ the ‘nurse’ 
said, ‘It has to be tight for it to work.’  Then, without missing a beat, she started firing 
off the standard series of questions about sexual conduct.  ‘How many times have you 
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had sex?  You haven’t been using protection have you?  How many men have you 
been with anyway?  You probably can’t count how many.’ (Luttrell 2003: 120) 
Luttrell (2003) poses the question of what might be possible if one could turn questions of 
‘judgment’ about teenage parents into questions of interest about their sense of self and 
identity-making.  For us, this in turn speaks to the question of the limits and possibilities that 
shape the work that we might do as researchers and educators, and how we might trouble or 
unsettle these. Many of our conversations about the issues we are exploring here have been 
framed, intellectually, by the work of Michel Foucault.  Of particular interest is Foucault’s 
(2007a, 2007b) apparent Enlightenment turn in a series of essays that he wrote towards the 
end of his life.  In her examination of the ways in which Foucault’s essays on critique and 
enlightenment provoke different ways of thinking about what it is that we do when, as part of 
our intellectual practice, we engage in critique, Judith Butler (2002: 218) argues that 
Foucault’s account(ing) of/for enlightenment is ‘one that no “Enlightenment” thinker would 
accept’.  But this refusal does not, she argues, ‘invalidate’ the sort of characterization that 
Foucault develops. As Butler suggests it is ‘precisely what remains “unthought”’ within the 
terms of enlightenment that Foucault tries to identify and describe.  The key claim that Butler 
explores is that Foucault’s provocations open up a space in which it is possible to think of 
critique as being less about judgment, and more about a process of de-subjugation in which 
we, the subjects who do critique, refuse, by degree, to be governed in such and such a way, in 
relation to such and such ends.  
It is in this sense that Foucault (2007b: 118) suggests that enlightenment can be 
considered as an ethos.  For Foucault, enlightenment, as a ‘critical ontology of ourselves’ 
should not be imagined as a ‘theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge 
that is accumulating’.  Rather, enlightenment should be ‘conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility 
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of going beyond them.’  This ethos would mean that we ‘try to proceed with the analysis of 
ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the 
Enlightenment’, but in doing so we would seek to examine how our present conditions the 
limits and possibilities of our knowing and acting?  How might we trouble those limits?  How 
might we imagine the doing of social science in ways that embrace the ambivalence of the 
human condition? 
As Foucault (2007a: 113, original emphasis) imagines it, this ethos can be understood 
as a ‘limit attitude’.  Indeed, criticism consists of ‘analyzing and reflecting upon limits’.  In 
Butler’s (2002: 212-213) essay on Foucault’s mode of critique, originally presented as the 
2000 Raymond Williams lecture at Cambridge University, she makes reference to a concern 
expressed by Williams that the notion of ‘criticism has been unduly restricted to the notion of 
“fault-finding”’.  Butler suggests that what Williams called for was a more limited, specific 
form of critique that did not ‘generalize too quickly: “what always needs to be understood,” 
he wrote, “is the specificity of the response, which is not a judgment, but a practice”’.  For 
Butler this explicit use of a vocabulary that incorporates concerns with practice, specificity 
and judgment opens up or maps out similar spaces to Foucault. There is a positive dimension 
to critique as Foucault (2007a:113) imagines it: ‘The point . . . is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a 
possible transgression’.  More specifically critique seeks to imagine ‘in what is given to us as 
universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, 
and the product of arbitrary constraints?’  
The troubling part of Foucault’s ethos is captured in the ways in which he imagines 
what would make critique genealogical.  Critique, in this form, ‘will not deduce from the 
form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and know’;  it ‘will separate out … the 
possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 2007a: 
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114).  Critique understood in this way would make problematic both the ways in which we 
imagine and conduct ourselves in relation to such things as researching the problem of 
teenage pregnancy and parenting, and how we imagine personhood, its formation, its 
practice.  As Butler (2002: 220-221) argues, the purchase of Foucault’s position becomes 
apparent when we ask questions such as: ‘Who can we become in such a world where the 
meanings and limits of the subject are set out in advance for us?  By what means are we 
constrained as we begin to ask what we may become?’ ;in considering ‘what happens when 
we begin to become that for which there is no place in the given regime of truth?’ 
Reflexive hindsight: a space of/for ambivalence in Youth Studies? 
In this final section we try to write some of this ambivalence into being. What would 
inopportune, untimely thinking from the perspective of reflexive hindsight look like?  What 
might this mode of thinking contribute to the ways in which adult social scientists, who once 
were young, do Youth Studies?  If we allow some space for what we have been calling 
reflexive hindsight in the ways in which we think about doing the social science that takes 
young people, including young people who are teenage parents, as its objects, then how 
might this position, this standpoint trouble the limits of what we have come to know and 
enact as social science? 
In the context of her ethnographic engagement with black teen mothers in the US 
Wendy Luttrell (2003: 161-164) writes vividly of the epistemological tensions that are 
embedded in ethnographic ways of knowing. In writing about the ambivalence she felt and 
experienced between the scholarly demand for analytic distance, and her emotional 
engagement with the lives of her research participants, Luttrell describes who how she often 
felt ‘split at her roots’.  This ambivalence, she suggests, is irresolvable.  In the vocabulary we 
have been developing here this challenge is about how we are prepared, or equipped, or 
inclined to engage with the limits, the possibilities, the ambivalences of what we have 
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become, as we engage with the limits, the possibilities, the ambivalences of the young lives 
we encounter and then enact in the process and the products of our research. What, for 
example, should we, can we, do we make of a story like Tara’s whose father died in a car 
accident while she was a child, and whose mother has recently died from cancer?  
Anyway, if my mother was alive I wouldn’t be having the baby. You know, how 
when a family member dies and you get pregnant as a way to deal with it? My mother 
died in November and I got pregnant in November so I needed to keep the baby [it is 
April]. I always wanted to have a baby, but not so soon, and since my mother isn’t 
alive I went ahead and decided to have it. You know she [her mother] told me not to 
cry at her funeral, so I didn’t cry. (cited in Luttrell 2003: 56-57) 
We are not claiming that reflexive hindsight provides us/anyone with a privileged position 
from which to make sense of Tara’s story (or anything, for that matter).  Rather, we suggest 
that reflexive hindsight is a tool with which adult social scientists who do Youth Studies 
might unsettle who it is that we have become as we do Youth Studies.  As adult researchers, 
trained in our craft, there are both limits and possibilities within the generative space that 
occurs in the tension between analytical detachment and emotional participation. In the past 
three decades, this question of reflexivity has been taken up in different ways, in different 
spaces, for different purposes by educational theorists, feminists, post structuralists, 
geographers, and queer theorists in the social sciences more broadly, and in different parts of 
the field of Youth Studies more particularly (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Jones 2003; Philo 
2003) .    At this time we want to locate our concerns in the experiences of one of us for 
whom the problem of teenage pregnancy and parenting is experienced from the inside, a 
standpoint that offers the possibility of reflexive hindsight and, to some extent, the possibility 
of an unmarginalized ‘teenage voice’, that resides in the emotionality, the embodiment, and 




In the years subsequent to my doctoral studies I spent some time lecturing to second 
and third year undergraduate students in Youth, Culture and Social Change.  In one of 
our modules we focused on Gender, Sex and Sexuality, spending some time to 
consider teenage parents as a ‘flash point’ of community concerns about teenage 
sexuality.  I was struck each year by the reaction of students when I would ‘declare’ 
my status as a teenage parent, one who had been ‘rendered decent’ by the passage of 
time but was still — and would forever more be —16 years older than my daughter.  
It was a large class, a lecture delivered in a tiered theatre and a moment of stillness 
would ensue as the students, many from privileged backgrounds, thought about the 
ambiguity of my hybrid status: ‘dropout’ and ‘Dr’ and ‘lecturer’ and ‘teenage parent’.  
As a group, we would be brought face-to-face with Butler’s (2002) questions that can 
often only be answered with the benefit of hindsight:  ‘Who can a teenage parent 
become in a world where the meanings and limits of teenage parents are set out in 
advance?  By what means are teenage parents constrained as they began to ask what I 
might become?’ 
My memories of those early years when my age made my status as a mother 
problematic are undoubtedly partial.  Looking back will always be incomplete: 
sometimes forgotten, sometimes censored.  In a series of conversations about the 
possibilities and limitations of ‘remembering’ we have discussed my censoring of 
parts of the story shared in this paper, my struggle with disclosing what seem to be 
significant memories because, in the telling, they also tell partial stories of others 
about whom I care.  As such, we fully accept the limits of what can be remembered, 
of what can be — or will be — told. Yet our remembering — complete with our at 
times deliberate forgetting — offers more in pursuit of a certain ethos than a refusal to 
acknowledge there is any story at all, any thinking to be done about the possibilities 
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offered by our different identifications with the young people we now take as our 
object.  Whether or not I choose to acknowledge it, reflexive hindsight informs my 
thinking about the problem of teenage pregnancy and parenting in the same way that 
my thinking about the teenage pregnancy and parenting informs my understanding of 
myself as a former teenage parent. 
Citing the work of Annie Rogers and her colleagues, Luttrell (2003: 163, our emphasis) 
highlights the partial nature of any account that we can produce of our lives: ‘what is said and 
what remains unsaid and perhaps unsayable depends on what can be held in memory and re-
imagined as a story to tell, which further depends upon the listener’s moment by moment 
responses’ to stories such as Tara’s.  Those responses can be honed by a willingness to re-
embody our own human experiences of acute childhood loss, or risky alcohol use, or making 
a decision to become a parent.  At the same time, Luttrell notes that what she could know 
about the young women in her research was dependent on their capacity to tell their story, 
fragments of their story, at any given time.  In a related observation Mann suggests that 
young people’s lives are ‘not remembered in tranquility in the calm waters of late maturity 
but described in the full flood of experience, riding the rapids of tumultuous feelings’ (cited 
Luttrell 2003: 148). Mann’s hope for the calm waters of late maturity would seem to suggest 
that reflexive hindsight is a tranquil space from which to construct a clear, coherent, truthful 
account of a life.  We don’t necessarily subscribe to such a view.  Valerie Walkerdine’s 
(1997) Daddy’s Girl is an example of a deeply personal, often painful, revisiting of her 
childhood experiences and/or memories of these in making sense of her academic work.  Late 
maturity does not have to be any more or less an ambivalent space than the teenage years.  Or 
any time in between. 
In her contribution to a collection canvassing the methodological issues related to 
doing critical Youth Studies, Knopp Biklen (2007) cautions adults who do ethnographies of 
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young people about the troubles they may find on their trips down ‘memory lane’.  Yet for 
us,  a reflexive hindsight offers a particular intervention into the knowledge practices of the 
social sciences that makes explicit the ambivalence and ambiguity, even irony of adult social 
scientists — who once were young — taking the behaviors and dispositions, the hopes, fears 
and aspirations, of young people as their objects. This form of intellectual practice attempts to 
embody the ethos that Foucault sketched, one that compels us to imagine how it is that we 
have become who we are despite who we were once ‘destined’ to be; to think about the limits 
and possibilities of what it is that we are/do when we call ourselves social scientists.  A point 
to stress here is that we do not offer a programmatic guide of ‘how to do Youth Studies’ (in 
all of its diversity and plurality). That would be contradictory to what we have discussed 
here. And, we are not saying that what we offer is unique and/or dependent on subjective 
experience. Our engagements with Foucault, Bauman, Butler and, in a more explicit way, 
with Wendy Luttrell’s sense of being split at the roots do, however, suggest what Deleuze & 
Guattari (1987)  might call ‘lines of flight’ as we work at the limits and possibilities of doing 
Youth Studies. As a mode of giving form to thinking reflexive hindsight challenges us in at 
least two ways.  The first is to explore ways of thinking, writing and doing social research 
that works with ambivalence rather than seeking to exterminate it.  The second is that this 
line of flight opens a space to speak back to the many assumptions, presumptions and 
prejudices that attach too readily to young people, particularly those who potentially suffer 
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